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Abstract 
As  part  of  the general trend  toward  interdisciplinary re- 
search in recent years, a growing number of  investigators have 
come to consider both cognitive and neuroscientific perspec- 
tives when theorizing about memory. Although such cognitive 
neuroscience analyses are a relatively recent development, the 
approach  has  precedents in  earlier scientific  thinking  about 
memory. In  this article we present a historical review of  three 
major issues in memory research-consolidation processes, the 
nature of  memory representations, and multiple memory sys- 
tems. We  discuss the nature of  the relation between  cognitive 
Cognitive neuroscience is  a fundamentally interdiscipli- 
nary pursuit that draws on the methodological tools and 
theoretical frameworks of  both of  its constituent  disci- 
plines. In doing so, it promises to provide a more com- 
plete understanding of  mnemonic processes than could 
be achieved by  either discipline alone. During the past 
few decades, the cognitive neuroscience  approach has 
become increasingly prominent in the analysis of  mem- 
ory. A growing number of  cognitive scientists have made 
use  of  findings  and ideas  about  brain  function  (e.g., 
Schacter,  1985a;  McClelland  and  Rumelhart,  1986a, 
1986b; Shimamura,  1989), and similarly an  increasing 
number of  neuroscientists have drawn on cognitive the- 
ories and paradigms (e.g., Kean & Nadel, 1982; Mishkin 
& Petri, 1984; Squire, 1987). Although still in its infancy, 
this approach has already begun to yield important in- 
sights into various aspects of  memory, and there is every 
reason to believe that it will become even more promi- 
nent in the future. 
Although the emergence of  widespread interest in cog- 
nitive neuroscience  analyses of  memory is a relatively 
recent phenomenon, the approach itself is not entirely 
without  precedent in the history of  scientific thinlung 
about memory. Thus, for example, investigators such as 
Ribot  (1882),  Burnham  (1903),  Semon  (19041921), 
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and  neuroscientific approaches to  each  of  these issues with 
respect to the distinction between collateral, complementary, 
and convergent relations (Schacter, 1986).  Although some early 
investigators  offered analyses  that  linked psychological  and 
physiological perspectives, there is little historical evidence of 
systematic or sustained interdisciplinary research. However, 
more recent work, especially with respect to hypotheses about 
memory systems, suggests progress toward  establishing pro- 
grammatic interdisciplinary research. m 
Hebb (1949), and even Freud (1895; in Bonaparte, Freud, 
& &is,  1954) put forward what could be broadly con- 
strued as memory theories that drew on both psycho- 
logical and physiological perspectives.  Nevertheless, we 
are not aware of  any scholarly attempt to trace system- 
atically the extent  to  which  memory  researchers  have 
attempted to combine these two  approaches. The main 
purpose of  this article is to  provide  the beginnings of 
such an analysis. 
There are several reasons why such a historical analysis 
is worth pursuing. First, there is simple intellectual cu- 
riosity about the antecedents to  what is now an estab- 
lished  trend  in  memory  research.  Second,  the early 
investigators who attempted to  develop cognitive neu- 
roscience analyses should be recognized for their efforts. 
Third, and most importantly, examining previous inter- 
actions  between  psychological  and  physiological  ap- 
proaches  may provide  useful  insights  and lessons for 
contemporary researchers,  showing  how progress  to- 
ward resolving critical issues in the domain of  memory 
can often be made most easily within an interdisciplinary 
framework. 
Instead of  attempting to provide a comprehensive his- 
torical  analysis, we have  focused  on three  issues  that 
have been, and continue to be, major problems of  inter- 
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resentations, and multiple  memory systems. The paper 
is  divided into three main sections that are devoted to 
each of  these issues, respectively. Within each section, 
we provide  a historical  overview  of  the cognitive  and 
neuroscientific approaches to the issue, discuss the na- 
ture and extent of  interdisciplinary interactions, and as- 
sess  the  degree  to  which  the  two  approaches  have 
influenced each other. 
We  will  consider the interactions  (or lack of  them) 
between  cognitive  and  neuroscientific  approaches  to 
memory  in  terms  of  a  distinction  between  collateral, 
complementary,  and  converging  relations between  re- 
search methodologies  (Schacter,  1986). Collateral rela- 
tions refer to situations in which two  or more approaches 
to  a  particular  issue  are pursued independently,  with 
little or no interaction. Complementary relations, in con- 
trast, are observed when the analysis of  a phenomenon 
in one discipline can usefully supplement the analysis of 
a similar phenomenon in another discipline. Finally, con- 
vergent relations refer to situations in which scientists in 
two  or more disciplines  coordinate their research pro- 
grams so as to investigate a particular  issue or phenom- 
enon with the tools and ideas of  each of  the disciplines. 
The existence of  convergent  relations signals the pres- 
ence of  a true interdisciplinary enterprise. In what fol- 
lows,  we  discuss  the  kind  of  relations  that  have 
historically existed between cognitive and neuroscientific 
approaches  to  each of  the three memory  issues, and 
consider the extent to which convergent relations have 
begun to develop. 
CONSOLIDATION 
The notion  that  memories  become permanently  fixed, 
or consolidated, only some time after registration  of  a 
stimulus  or event,  is  a  familiar  construct  in  memory 
research. Although a consolidation stage is  a generally, 
though  not  universally, accepted  part  of  the memory 
formation  process,  exactly what  is  meant  by  the term 
consolidation  remains  largely  unspecified  after  nearly 
100 years of  research-so  much so that Crowder (1989) 
recently referred to the term as “bankrupt.”  For example, 
consolidation  can be used  in  a physiological sense to 
refer  to  neural  activation  or reverberation  following 
presentation of  a stimulus (e.g., Muller & Pilzecker, 1900; 
Burnham,  1903; Decamp, 1915; Hebb,  1949), or in a 
psychological sense to refer to more abstract processes 
occurring during the same, or a more extended, period 
of  time  (e.g., Burnham,  1903; Bartlett,  1932; Squire, 
Cohen, & Nadel, 1984). At another level, confusion exists 
over whether consolidation is better viewed as an active 
or a  passive  process:  in  both  cases  the  result  is  the 
formation of  a potentially permanent memory, yet there 
are important  differences between  models  of  consoli- 
dation that depict it as resulting from automatic mecha- 
nisms and those that  depict  it  as  requiring effort and 
organization. Yet  another  area of  debate  concerns the 
duration of  the consolidation process. Estimations of  the 
time required for consolidation to conclude have varied 
from several seconds to years. These issues have framed 
the nature of  consolidation  research  for  the past  100 
years, and serve as the focus for the present review. 
Historical Overview 
Although  analogies for  memory  have  been  around at 
least  since the ancient  Greeks  (e.g., Plato’s notion  of 
etchings in a tablet of  wax), the explicit identification of 
the notion that it might take time for a process to create 
permanent memories is relatively new. Quintillian, in his 
treatise Institutio Oratoria (On  the Education of the Or- 
ator),  seems to be the first person to make reference to 
such a process of  fixation or consolidation. In reflecting 
on how the interval of  one night can greatly increase the 
strength of  memory, he referred to “a process of  ripening 
and maturing” (Herrmann & Chaffin, 1988, p. 103). Other 
than  this  passing  mention  of  the  possibility  that  the 
strength of  a memory can increase over time, we have 
been unable to  find evidence that the concept of  con- 
solidation was considered until the late nineteenth cen- 
tury. 
Early Psychological Investigations and 
Physiological Speculations 
Muller and Pilzecker (1900) are usually cited as the pri- 
mary reference to consolidation. Although they may have 
been the first to use the term “consolidation,”  hypotheses 
about such a concept based on clinical evidence predate 
their  work  by  about  20  years.  Ribot  (1882,  1892), for 
instance, invoked the notion of  consolidation to explain 
brief periods of  retrograde amnesia, finding that when 
recovering from unconsciousness, a patient “lost not only 
the recollection  of  the accident . . . but also the recol- 
lection of  a more or less long period of  his life before 
the accident” (1892, p. 779). He cited 26 cases of  retro- 
grade amnesia that were first reported by Dr. Frank Ham- 
ilton. In these early anecdotal accounts, the amnesia was 
thought to be very short, affecting memory for events in 
the minutes preceding the trauma. Ribot concluded that 
“in order that a recollection may organize and fix itself, 
a certain time is necessary, which in consequence of  the 
cerebral  excitement  [in the case  of  trauma] does not 
suffice” (Ribot, 1892, p. 799). 
Muller  and Pilzecker (1900)  extended the notion of 
consolidation beyond previous anecdotal and clinical ac- 
counts by conducting a series of  experiments in which 
they  manipulated  subjects’ activity between  study  and 
test. They observed that  memory performance was re- 
lated to the nature of  interpolated activity. For example, 
a task of  describing a landscape picture between studying 
nonsense syllables and a subsequent memory test pro- 
duced poorer  memory  performance  than  a  condition 
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concluded that a “physiological activity persists for some 
minutes in the nervous tracts concerned, and that this 
. . . increases the  fixity of  the  associations” (cited  in 
McDougall, 1901, p. 393). McDougall saw the connection 
between this finding and Ribot’s work, suggesting that it 
“throws  light upon, we might almost say explains, certain 
recorded cases in which a severe blow on the head has 
wiped out completely the  memory of  immediately pre- 
ceding events. It throws light too on the fact, noted by 
some persons,  that what  is  learnt  immediately before 
falling asleep is often remembered with exceptional ac- 
curacy” (p. 393).  A  return,  it  appears, to  Quintillian’s 
original example. It is interesting to note that this very 
hypothesis became  the  subject of  direct  experimental 
investigation aimed at  distinguishing between theories 
of  decay and interference in explaining forgetting (e.g., 
Jenkins & Dallenbach, 1924). 
In this early experimental phase, Burnham (1903) pro- 
vided the most detailed consideration of  consolidation. 
Unlike Muller and Pilzecker, he discussed consolidation 
not only in terms of  hypothetical physiological activity, 
but also with respect to psychological processes of  or- 
ganization and association: 
In normal memory a process of  organization is con- 
tinually going on, a physical process of  organization 
and a psychological process of  repetition and associ- 
ation. In order that ideas may become part of  perma- 
nent memory, time must elapse for these processes 
of  organization to be completed. (p. 132) 
Burnham based his theory primarily on evidence from 
cases of  retrograde amnesia that, like Ribot, he viewed 
as  evidence for  a  consolidation deficit: “The essential 
characteristic of  these cases of retroactive amnesia is that 
the memory is lost because it was never fully organized’ 
(p. 129). Foreshadowing future consideration of  the “ac- 
tive-passive’’ theme, he suggested that the consolidation 
process is not merely one of repetition, but that it also 
includes the formation of  associations that depend on 
“physiological processes”  that  are  extended  in  time. 
Burnham acknowledged that his theory was  similar to 
that of  Ribot, and also acknowledged the contribution of 
Ebbinghaus (1885/1964) to his thoughts on the role that 
time plays in processes of  organization. When learning 
nonsense syllables, Ebbinghaus found that massed prac- 
tice was less effective than spaced practice. Burnham took 
this as evidence that “there must be time for nature to 
do her part” (p. 131). 
At about the same time that Burnham published his 
work, independent (and more general) physiological re- 
search into the nature of  nerve excitations was  being 
conducted by  Sherrington (1906). His  primary interest 
was  in  the possibility of  afterdischarge in  nerve cells, 
particu!arly  in  the  spinal cord. Although this research 
does not appear to have been conducted with questions 
of  memory or consolidation in mind, it did provide an 
early model for, and apparent confirmation of, the spec- 
ulations of such researchers as Muller and Pilzecker and 
Burnham-namely,  that excitations in the nervous system 
could continue after the stimulus ceased to exist. 
All of  the early researchers speculated about a physi- 
ological mechanism underlying the process of  consoli- 
dation.  Decamp  (1915),  however,  presented  what 
Glickman (1961) later described as “probably the most 
detailed  piece  of  pseudoneurological  speculation” 
(p. 218): 
From the neurological standpoint, in the learning of 
a series of  syllables, we may assume that a certain 
group of  synapses, nerve-cells, nerve paths, centres, 
etc., are involved. Immediately after the learning pro- 
cess that after-discharge continues for a short time, 
tending to set the associations between the just 
learned syllables. Any mental activity engaged in dur- 
ing this after-discharge, involving or partially involv- 
ing the same neurological group, tends, more or 
less, to block the after-discharge, and gives rise to 
retroactive inhibition. Engagement in any mental ac- 
tivity involving a new-so  far as it is new-group  of 
synapses, neurones, etc., would allow the setting pro- 
cess of  the just excited group to proceed unhin- 
dered. The effect of  retroactive inhibition would vary 
directly as the relative identity of  the neurological 
groups concerned. (p. 62) 
Despite the speculative nature of  this account, it is  re- 
markably similar in some respects to  the cell-assembly 
theory that Hebb (1949) produced 30 years later. 
A review of  prominent psychology texts of  the 1920s 
(e.g., Pieron, 1929; Woodworth, 1929) reveals that con- 
solidation was already considered to be an integral part 
of  the memory process. The sources of  evidence cited 
as supporting the phenomenon  included (1) so-called 
“shock amnesia,”  where retrograde effects suggested that 
the shock interfered with  a consolidation-like process; 
(2) retroactive interference, in which the nature of  the 
interpolated task, and its difficulty, suggested that some 
part of  the mnemonic process continues after the stim- 
ulus  is  terminated; and  (3) perseveration  (or sponta- 
neous  recollection) of  recently encountered  material, 
especially of  materials that were learned  during  inter- 
rupted activity (e.g.,  Zeigarnik effect), attested to the con- 
tinuation  of  central  activity  after  stimulus  cessation. 
Notwithstanding this catalog, there remained a healthy 
skepticism about the reality of  consolidation, as exem- 
plified by  Lashley’s view that consolidation “can be ex- 
plained equally well by other hypotheses” (Lashley, 1918, 
p. 363) and Woodworth’s suggestion that “the evidence 
for a consolidation process following active learning is 
rather  scrappy  and  inconclusive” (Woodworth,  1929, 
p. 92). 
From  this  promising  beginning,  research  into pro- 
cesses of  consolidation was overshadowed by studies of 
retroactive interference and the movement toward be- 
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ence paradigms (e.g., McGeogh, 1932) focused on how 
“memory strength” could be measured by, or was related 
to, the degree of  interference between study and test. At 
the same time, with  the widespread  acceptance of  be- 
haviorism, most psychologists  belittled  the importance 
of  explanations  based  on physiological  activity  in  the 
analysis of  psychological processes, including memory. 
These historical developments no doubt contributed to 
the end of  the early phase of  thinking about consolida- 
tion and led to a brief dormant period for consolidation 
research. 
Early Eqerimental Studies 
This dormant period persisted for only about 10 years, 
until Zubin  and Barrera  (1941)  presented  the first ex- 
perimenial studies of  the impact of  brain stimulation on 
consolidation. They observed  the effect of  electrocon- 
vulsive  shock (ECS)  on paired  associate  learning, and 
reported that the impact of  ECS depended on the interval 
between  learning and the disruptive brain  stimulation. 
More specifically, the briefer the interval between learn- 
ing and ECS,  the more adverse  its  effect  on memory 
performance.  This  finding  paralleled  that  observed  in 
naturally occurring retrograde  amnesia. Therefore, the 
ECS  procedure  seemed  to  provide  an  experimental 
method that could interrupt the consolidation process in 
a controlled fashion. 
Although their study had been conducted in humans, 
Zubin  and  Barerra’s  research  aroused  the  interest  of 
animal  psychologists  by  apparently  providing  a viable 
method for systematic investigation of  consolidation. For 
the next 30 years, researchers concentrated their efforts 
on two fundamental aspects of  the consolidation process: 
(1) how  long  it  takes  fixation to  occur, and (2)  what 
kinds of  neurophysiological processes  are critical to its 
successful conclusion. In what follows we focus on the 
former question; any analysis of  the latter would take us 
far afield and demand attention to such detailed matters 
as protein synthesis, macromolecules, DC potentials, and 
more. Though  fascinating,  this  pursuit  is  beyond  the 
scope of  the present article. 
Duncan (1949) conducted the first study into the ef- 
fects of  ECS on memory consolidation in laboratory an- 
imals. He trained rats to  associate the appearance of a 
light with a shock to the feet, and administered ECS  to 
different groups of  rats at various times following each 
learning trial, using intervals ranging from 20 sec to  14 
hr. Duncan reported a clear pattern of  impairment that 
was associated with the length of  the interval between 
the conditioning trial (training) and the ECS: the sooner 
ECS  was administered after the light-shock pairing, the 
more it appeared to inhibit the ability of  the rat to form 
an  association  between  the  light  and the shock. The 
inhibitory effect of  the ECS  occurred so long as it was 
administered  within  60 min of  the learning trial, sug- 
gesting that consolidation lasted for up to 1 hr. 
However, Miller and Coons (1955) provided another 
interpretation of  the same result. They argued that the 
observed behavioral effects of  ECS could have been pro- 
duced, not by disruption of  a consolidation process, but 
rather by the creation of  fear in the experimental animals. 
Coons and Miller (1960) compared the consolidation and 
conflict interpretations  of  ECS  effects by arranging  an 
experiment  in  which  amnestic and fear-related  effects 
would oppose each other rather than summate, as was 
the case in Duncan’s original experiment. This was ac- 
complished by using a “passive” rather than an “active” 
avoidance  design.  That  is, the  rat’s  task  involved not 
making a particular response, thereby producing a situ- 
ation in which fear, and the “freezing” typically elicited 
by  it, would be  likely  to  improve rather  than  hinder 
performance.  Coons and Miller observed that learning 
of  this passive avoidance task was faster when ECS closely 
followed each trial, and concluded that “while these re- 
sults do not disprove the occurrence of  retrograde am- 
nesia, they  cast  serious  doubts on the conclusions of 
previous  studies  purporting  to  prove  its  occurrence” 
(Coons & Miller, 1960, p. 531). In retrospect, the lasting 
contribution of  this study may have been its use of  the 
passive avoidance paradigm, which both controlled for 
the possibility that ECS  was  having  its effects through 
fear conditioning, and provided a learning task of  suffi- 
cient simplicity that animals could learn it in one or at 
most a few trials. Much subsequent research on consol- 
idation came to  rely on such tasks, which enabled  re- 
searchers to determine with some certainty exactly when 
learning occurred, and hence when the memory  con- 
solidation process could be said to have started. 
In an independent line of  enquiry, not actually directed 
at the question of  consolidation, Brady and Hunt (1951; 
Hunt & Brady, 1951) tested the effect of  ECS on learning 
of  a conditioned emotional response (CER)  in rats. This 
task, first reported by Estes and Skinner (1941), involved 
pairing a stimulus such as a tone or a light, with a shock 
delivered  to  the water  spout from  which  the animal 
drank. The CER  was observed as a significant decrease 
in contacts with the water spout during presentation of 
the tone or light  CS.  In  early  experiments  Brady and 
Hunt observed that ECS  could reduce or eliminate pre- 
viously conditioned emotional responses. However, sub- 
sequent experiments (Brady, 1951) showed that ECS  did 
not actually obliterate the CER  because it could “spon- 
taneously” reappear within 30 days of  the ECS treatment. 
Brady (1952) then showed that  conditioned  emotional 
responses  could  survive  ECS  treatments that were de- 
layed by more than 30 days. Taking these results together, 
Brady  concluded  that  “the conditioned  emotional  re- 
sponse increases in strength with elapsed time and that 
this increase in strength (or, perhaps, change in quality) 
may be sufficient to obscure the effects which ECS  has 
upon the response” (Brady, 1952, p. 13). This hypothesis 
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nism. 
Experiments that attempted to identify a time course 
of the consolidation process were not limited to the use 
of  ECS to interrupt memory processes (see Lewis, 1969). 
Other methods included using anoxia (e.g., Hayes, 1953; 
Ransmeier & Gerard, 1954; Thompson & Pryer,  1956), 
anesthesia  (e.g.,  Leukel,  1957),  temperature  changes 
(Gerard,  1955), and brain  stimulation  (e.g, Glickman, 
1958; Thompson, 1958). These different methods, much 
like ECS  itself, produced quite inconsistent results. As  a 
consequence, by the 1970s the idea that consolidation 
entailed a simple fixation process was no longer tenable. 
The time course for consolidation appeared to be quite 
different from study to study (Chorover, 1976), and per- 
haps even experiment specific (McGaugh & Gold, 1976). 
As  a result of  the variability in the time course of  the 
consolidation process, McGaugh and Gold (1976) argued 
that  “RA [retrograde amnesia] gradients do not provide 
a direct measure of  the time required for the consoli- 
dation of  long-term memory” (p. 550), and furthermore 
suggested that  “memory disruption studies provide di- 
rect information only about the susceptibility of  memory 
to  disruption;  they  do not  provide  direct  information 
about the underlying  memory processes” (McGaugh & 
Gold, 1976, p. 551; see also Weiskrantz, 1966; McGaugh 
& Dawson, 1971; Gold & McGaugh, 1975). 
Much of  the aforementioned research, aimed at deter- 
mining the duration of  a time-dependent consolidation 
process, was  strongly influenced  by Hebb’s theoretical 
ideas. He argued for a dual-trace memory process at the 
physiological level: a transient trace is first established, 
which then undergoes  some structural modification  in 
order to become more permanent. According to Hebb 
“the persistence or repetition of  a reverberatory activity 
(or ”trace“)  tends to induce lasting cellular changes that 
add  to  its  stability” (Hebb,  1949, p. 62).  Note  that  in 
Hebb’s formulation the transient trace is located in the 
same ensemble of  neurons as the permanent trace; in- 
deed, it was precisely the reverberation  underlying the 
transient  trace  that  provided  the  repeated  activations 
leading to the permanent, structural, modifications. This 
structural  modification  was  quite  similar  to  the early 
concepts of  consolidation posited by Ribot, Muller, and 
Pilzecker, Burnham, and Decamp. Despite the obvious 
similarity to these earlier speculations (see previous sec- 
tion), Hebb (1949) seemed unaware of  his predecessors, 
as he failed to  cite any of  the early researchers  in his 
well-known monograph. 
Though this era was dominated by physiologically ori- 
ented studies of  consolidation, there was one prominent 
addition to the paradigms available for studying consol- 
idation at the psychological  level-the  Brown-Peterson 
short-term memory task (Brown, 1958; Peterson  & Pe- 
terson, 1959). In this task subjects are presented with a 
string of three or four letters or numbers, and are then 
asked to  repeat them after a retention  interval ranging 
from 0 to  60 sec. Rehearsal of  the to-be-remembered 
information is inhibited by having the subjects perform 
any one of  a number of  arithmetic operations. Although 
Peterson and Peterson (1959) failed to make any refer- 
ence  to  consolidation  or the consolidation  literature, 
Brown (1958) delineated a link between these short-term 
memory experiments and the process of  consolidation. 
In particular, he suggested “that the lability of  the mem- 
ory trace-at  least to gross cerebral disturbance-is  high- 
est immediately after learning and declines rapidly with 
age”, citing the ECS  work of  Duncan (1949) as evidence 
(Brown,  1958, p. 18). His  experiments  on short-term 
memory confirmed that memory traces are most fragile 
immediately  after  they  are formed  by  showing  rapid 
forgetting over time. 
Recent Research 
The skepticism inherent in the literature reviews during 
the 1970s (e.g., Chorover, 1976; Gold & McGaugh, 1976) 
led to another change in how the process of  consolida- 
tion was investigated. If  the traditional types of  disruption 
experiments  could  not  shed light  on the duration  of 
consolidation, and if Hebb’s theoretical formulation re- 
garding short-term reverberation could not account for 
lengthy consolidation effects, it was unclear how to pro- 
ceed. At  about this  time, however, neuropsychological 
studies began to address the consolidation issue. These 
studies focused on the locus of  memory failure in am- 
nesic patients-that  is, whether the deficit could be at- 
tributed to a storage or  a retrieval problem. For example, 
Milner  (1965)  suggested that  the anterograde  amnesia 
observed  in  the classic patient HM  could be attributed 
to a consolidation deficit: adequate short-term traces are 
not  transformed  into  permanent  traces  (e.g.,  Hebb, 
1949). By  contrast, Warrington  and Weiskrantz  (1968, 
1970) sought to explain the same facts of  organic amnesia 
in a quite different way, as a defect in retrieval processes 
rather than in consolidatiodstorage  mechanisms. Satis- 
factory resolution  of  this  debate  has yet to occur (for 
discussion, see Miller & Springer, 1973; Miller & Marlin, 
1984; Wickelgren, 1979; Squire, 1980) because of  inher- 
ent difficulties in isolating the various stages in the mem- 
ory process  (e.g., Watkins, 1978). As  a result, the data 
regarding anterograde amnesia remain ambiguous with 
respect to the construct of  consolidation. 
The neuropsychological literature has also addressed 
the issue of  ‘‘long-term’’  consolidation  in studies of  re- 
trograde amnesia. In these studies, the question concerns 
whether or not there is a temporal gradient to the retro- 
grade amnesia observed in brain injured patients of  the 
kind  initially discussed by  Ribot (1882). To the extent 
that there is an identifiable gradient with  more recent 
memories selectively impaired, there is  evidence for a 
consolidation process that lasts considerably longer than 
the minutes envisioned by Ribot and Burnham. Initially, 
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no gradient to retrograde amnesia because they observed 
that premorbid events are equally likely to be recalled 
regardless of  the time period from which the events were 
selected. However,  Marslen-Wilson and Teuber  (1975) 
found evidence for a relative preservation of  older mem- 
ories in the amnesic patient HM, and Seltzer and Benson 
(1974) and Albert, Butters, and Levin  (1979)  reported 
temporal gradients in Korsakoff patients. Several authors 
have attempted to reconcile these disparate findings in 
terms of  methodological factors such as ceiling/floor ef- 
fects and saliency of  items  (Squire,  1987; McCarthy & 
Warrington, 1990). 
A series of  studies conducted by Squire and colleagues 
has attempted to document a gradient in retrograde am- 
nesia as evidence for a long-term consolidation process. 
For example, it was observed that electroconvulsive ther- 
apy (ECT) administered to psychiatric patients caused a 
retrograde amnesia for information learned for up to 3 
years  prior to  the treatment  (Squire,  Slater, & Chace, 
1975; Squire & Cohen, 1979). Although shorter temporal 
gradients had been observed in most animal studies (see 
previous  section), using  four spaced electroconvulsive 
shocks in mice, Squire and Spanis (1984) produced am- 
nesia for up to 3 weeks prior to the shock treatments. 
The idea that events occurring after initial registration 
of  a stimulus contribute to the ultimate outcome of  the 
consolidation process formed part of  the consolidation 
model proposed by Squire et al. (1984). These authors 
supposed that  information is first represented  in those 
temporal  lobe structures, primarily  the hippocampus, 
that are disrupted in organic amnesia. Over a fairly ex- 
tended period of  time, whose duration depends on in- 
tervening events that contribute to what can be viewed 
as “rehearsal,” this information or some subset of  it is 
established  in  brain  circuits outside  the hippocampus 
(presumably in neocortex). After some time period this 
extrahippocampal memory storage system becomes ca- 
pable of  supporting information retrieval on its own, and 
the active involvement of  the hippocampal system is no 
longer  required. This model has  the virtue  that  it  ac- 
counts for the existence of  fairly lengthy consolidation 
processes, explains the subtle role of  the hippocampal 
system, and seems consistent with  both  cognitive and 
neural accounts of  consolidation. 
Although most of  the recent research pertinent to this 
hypothesis has come from neuropsychological studies of 
human amnesia, research involving nonhuman primates 
has also provided some relevant evidence. Seeking evi- 
dence for retrograde amnesia in an experimental setting 
with monkeys, Dean and Weiskrantz (1974) trained ani- 
mals on a set of  visual object discriminations at varied 
times prior to malung lesions in area TE, a part of  the 
neocortex  known  to  be  essential  for  complex visual 
learning. They found no evidence for a gradient of  re- 
trograde amnesia over the 4-week period. 
Using the methods first employed by Dean and Weis- 
krantz (1974), Salmon, Zola-Morgan, and Squire (1987) 
sought evidence for a retrograde amnesia gradient after 
extensive lesions in the medial temporal region, includ- 
ing hippocampus and amygdala. They too failed to find 
evidence for the kind of  gradient that would demonstrate 
the existence of  a consolidation process. However, Zola- 
Morgan and Squire (1990) have recently reported a study 
in  monkeys  with  lesions  limited to  the hippocampus, 
which supports the model of  temporally graded retro- 
grade  amnesia.  Intact  animals  were taught  100 object 
discrimination problems  over  a  16-week period, such 
that 20 different problems were acquired at two-weekly 
intervals. Then, hippocampal excisions were performed, 
and memory was tested  by  examining  retention of  all 
the discriminations. Control monkeys performed  quite 
well on those object discriminations learned within the 
past  8 weeks,  and were  still  above  chance  on those 
learned 12 and 16 weeks prior to the surgery. Monkeys 
with hippocampal excisions were well below normal on 
the object discriminations learned up to 8 weeks prior 
to surgery, but seemed quite normal on those learned 
12 or 16 weeks earlier. They argued from these results 
that for at least an 8-week period after acquisition of  an 
object discrimination, normal memory performance re- 
quires that information be accessed from hippocampus; 
beyond  that  time  consolidation  has  proceeded  far 
enough in neocortex that removal of  the hippocampus 
does not prevent normal retention. Similar results have 
also been reported in rats tested on two different types 
of  memory tasks (Kubie, Dayyani, Muller, Cohen, Major, 
& Sutherland, 1990; Winocur, 1990). Once again, differ- 
ent tasks generated different estimates of  the length of 
the consolidation period. 
summary 
The earliest efforts in  consolidation  research  involved 
psychologists or medical scientists trying to explain the 
phenomena  of  retroactive  interference and retrograde 
amnesia. There is no evidence of  physiologically oriented 
research directed at issues of  memory consolidation dur- 
ing this period, perhaps reflecting the lack of  tools avail- 
able  to  explore  memory  at  this  level.  However, 
psychologists did not avoid discussions of  the brain, and 
the relation between mental and physiological processes. 
Not  only  did  they  consider  underlying  physiological 
events,  but  they  also  produced  detailed  speculations 
about what the underlying  mechanisms of  the psycho- 
logical processes  might  be  (e.g.,  Burnham,  1903; De- 
Camp, 1915). The  fact that  psychologists  made use of 
physiological observations in their formulations indicates 
a form of  what we have labeled complementary relations 
between the two approaches. 
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psychologists and physiologists paid only lip service to 
each other’s perspective  with  respect  to  memory pro- 
cesses in general, and consolidation  in particular.  For 
less important: neuroscientific research must necessarily 
consider cognitive phenomena if  it is to answer all the 
interesting questions about consolidation. 
example, the physiologist Konorski (1948) believed that 
“whereas  in  psychology  experimental  research  into 
memory  is  regarded as very important, and constitutes 
one of  the best  explored departments of  this  science, 
physiology so far has had little to say on the subject. One 
gets the impression that physiologists have even avoided 
raising  clear  issues  in  this  field” (p. 85). By  contrast, 
Stellar (1957) argued that  “psychologists have . . . not 
been able to develop concepts of  attention, intelligence, 
and even learning and memory that are satisfactory for 
physiological analysis.” Finally, toward the end of  this era 
Melton  (1963)  suggested  that  “memory has  never  en- 
joyed even a small fraction of  the interdisciplinary inter- 
est that has been expressed in symposia, discoveries, and 
methodological  innovations  during  the last  five years” 
(p.  1). Clearly  cognitive  and  neuroscientific  research 
agendas had little in common at this time-an  example 
of  what we have referred to  as collateral relations be- 
tween the two  fields. 
Cognitive psychology has had little to say about con- 
solidation  during  the past  25 years.  Nearly  all of  the 
relevant research has been conducted in the context of 
investigations of  reminiscence  (Ballard,  1913; Buxton, 
1943), hypermnesia (see Payne, 1987 for a review). Rem- 
iniscence refers to the possibility that memory strength 
can spontaneously increase over time, as evidenced by 
remembering previously forgotten  information without 
the benefit of  additional learning trials. As such, it would 
appear to suggest that consolidation continues long after 
learning. However, Roediger and Payne (1982) observed 
that reminiscence was a function of  practice effects as- 
sociated with repeated testing, and not merely a function 
of  the passage of  time alone. 
Although cognitive psychology itself has not contrib- 
uted  directly  to  recent  research  on consolidation, the 
past few years have witnessed a trend toward convergent 
relations  between  neuropsychological  analyses of  am- 
nesic patients and psychobiological  studies of  animals. 
Although the level of  neuroscientific analysis is still fairly 
gross (e.g., in terms of  regions of  the brain involved, as 
opposed to the nature of  cellular changes), the research 
of  Squire and colleagues, for example, has attempted to 
attack the consolidation issue with tools and ideas from 
both psychological  and physiological levels of  analysis, 
and in doing so has achieved a degree of  convergence 
between the levels. It seems likely that further interdis- 
ciplinary research will be necessary if consolidation is to 
become  an  operationally  defined,  and  theoretically 
understood,  aspect  of  memory.  Clearly, neurophysiol- 
ogical events are going to underlie the observed behav- 
ior changes manifested as a result of  consolidation. But 
this does not mean that the behavioral  events are any 
THE  NATURE OF MEMORY 
REPRESENTATIONS 
A fundamental issue throughout the history of  memory 
research  concerns the psychological  and physiological 
properties of  changes in the mindhrain that  preserve 
information over time-that  is, the nature of  the “mem- 
ory trace” or “engram.” We  refer  to this  issue as  the 
problem of  memory representation. Whereas studies of 
consolidation focus on the temporal properties of  mem- 
ory storage, research and theorizing about memory rep- 
resentations  attempt  to  specify  the  manner  in  which 
information is stored.  As we shall see, for more than 100 
years, the problem of  memory representation has been 
intimately  intertwined  with  the  question  of  whether 
memories are represented in a localized or distributed 
fashion. Although the problem of  memory representation 
involves issues other than localized vs. distributed stor- 
age, and issues  pertaining  to  localization  involve pro- 
cesses other than  memory, the two  problems  show a 
high degree of  historical overlap. The main question at 
hand concerns the nature of  the relation between psy- 
chological and physiological approaches to the general 
problem of  memory representation, which has most fre- 
quently taken  the form of  a debate about localized vs. 
distributed storage. 
The issue of  localized vs. distributed representations 
in memory has been debated at two  levels. First, there 
is the macro level of  analysis, which is concerned with 
where memories are represented. There are two general 
possibilities  here: either one or several regions of  the 
brain are responsible  for storing all sorts of  memories, 
or memories  are scattered  throughout  the brain.  The 
second  level  of  analysis  is  the  micro  level,  which  is 
concerned with how each memory is  represented, re- 
gardless of  where memories  (as  a  group) are stored. 
Once again there are two possibilities: either there are 
one-to-one mappings of  memories to one or a few nerve 
cells, or memories are distributed in networks through- 
out the brain  (or  region  of  the brain  responsible for 
memory). Although the focus of  the present section will 
be the micro-level question of  how individual memories 
are represented, we begin with a discussion of  the pre- 
cursors  to  this  debate  in the  form of  the macro-level 
issue of  where memory is represented. 
Historical Overview 
Early Pbysiological Speculations 
The idea that the storage of  memory might be confined 
to a specific area of  the brain can be traced to phrenology 
and its attempts to localize cerebral function in general. 
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areas of  the brain are responsible for different mental 
faculties (e.g. memory), and that the contours of the skull 
reflect the relative strengths of  these various faculties in 
each  individual. Although  this  extrapolation from  the 
shape of the skull to  underlying mental strengths and 
weakness was wildly inaccurate, the basic idea of  cerebral 
localization of  function has survived as an essential part 
of  modern day neuropsychology. Most  nineteenth-cen- 
tury  researchers,  including  Broca  (1861),  Wernicke 
(1874), and Munk (1881), favored a localizationist per- 
spective on cerebral functions, including memory. 
However, there were a few individuals who objected 
to this localizationist position, favoring instead the view 
that functional capacities are widely distributed  in the 
brain. Flourens (1824) presented evidence for this per- 
spective when  he  removed  parts  of  the  forebrain  of 
various  animals  and  observed  that  the  subsequent 
changes of  behavior did not depend on the precise part 
removed. This observation suggested to him that psycho- 
logical functions are not localized in  separate parts of 
the brain, and that behavioral changes after brain lesions 
are related to the size, rather than the location, of  the 
ablation. With  respect to memory function in particular, 
Kussmaul (1877) rejected the notion that memory has a 
“special storehouse in the brain where images and ideas 
lie together arranged in separate compartments” (cited 
in Gomulicki, 1953, p. 11). 
Although the debate at this macro level was never fully 
resolved, a shift in emphasis toward the micro-level issue 
of  how individual memories are represented occurred 
in the late nineteenth century. This shift seemed to result 
from a conflation between the two levels of the localized 
vs.  distributed representation  debate. For example, the 
philosopher  Alexander  Bain  rejected  the  notion  of  a 
“cerebral closet” of  memories. With  this statement, he 
seemed to be rejecting the localizationist perspective at 
the macro level, suggesting that memories do not reside 
in  one particular place. However, when he  suggested 
that  “for every act of  memory  . . . there  is  a specific 
tions’, ‘vestiges’, ‘traces’, etc. left  in  the  brain  by  past 
experience. Most writers leave the nature of  these ves- 
tiges vague; few think of  explicitly assimilating them to 
channels of  association” (James, 1890, p. 655-656). 
A far more detailed speculation about the nature of 
the physiology underlying memory representations was 
offered by Sigmund Freud in his prepsychoanalytic writ- 
ing, “Project for a Scientific Psychology” (published post- 
humously in Bonaparte et al., 1954). Freud identified the 
apparently contradictory requirement that neurons re- 
ceive and discharge impulses, but also retain some level 
of  excitation.  As  a result, he posited two types of neurons: 
“There are permeable neurones which serve the function 
of  perception, and impermeable neurones which are the 
vehicles of memory and presumably, therefore, of psych- 
ical processes in general” (Bonaparte et al., 1954,  p. 360). 
He believed that “memory is  represented by the differ- 
ences in the facilitations between the impermeable neu- 
rones” (Bonaparte  et  al.,  1954, p.  361).  Freud,  then, 
argued for a strict localization of  memory function with 
a one-to-one mapping between a specific memory and 
specific neuronal facilitation. However, 20 years later he 
recanted by acknowledging  that “every  attempt to deduce 
from the facts a localization of  mental processes, every 
endeavour to think of  ideas as stored up in nerve-cells 
and of  excitations as travelling along nerve-fibres, has 
completely miscarried’ (Bonaparte et al., 1954, p. 350). 
Jacques Loeb, a pioneer in experimental biology who 
tried to explain mental processes in terms of fundamen- 
tal  “tropisms,” presented  further,  apparently indepen- 
dent, speculations about the micro-level issue of  memory 
representations. He began his research as a student of 
Munk (who had performed well-known experiments on 
“mind blindness” in dogs), and early in his career be- 
lieved “that visual  images of  memory are localized in 
isolated cells or groups of  cells” (Loeb, 1901, p. 277). 
However, his own work  later forced him to  conclude 
that Munk was incorrect, leading him instead to present 
a detailed account of  the need for distributed represen- 
tations of  memory: 
grouping or co-ordination of  sensations and movements, 
by virtue of  specific growths in the cell-junctions’’  (cited 
in Gomulicki, 1953, p. 8), he was speculating at the micro 
level  of  analysis about  how  an  individual  memory is 
represented. 
Further speculations regarding the physiological na- 
ture of  memory representations came from sources such 
It is my  opinion that these histological or corpuscu- 
lar hypotheses of  the images of  memory must be 
supplanted by dynamical conceptions. The dynamics 
of  the process of  association is the true problem of 
brain-physiology. Even if the hypotheses of  psychic 
localization were not contradicated by all the facts, to 
point out the centres would not be a solution of  the 
as James (1890),  Freud (1895; in Bonapafle et a]., 1954), 
(1901/1973)? and Semen (1904/21)>  each Of whom 
dynamical problem, B~ merely  showing a student the 
location  of a power-plant,  we do not  explain  to  him 
will be considered in turn. In his landmark book Prin- 
ciples of  Psycholoa, William James (1890) presented  a 
-rather conservative summary of  early views on memory 
representations, arguing for an underlying physiological 
mechanism, but  acknowledging that  little was  known 
about it:  “These habit-worn paths of association are a 
clear rendering of  what  authors  mean by  ‘predisposi- 
the dynamics of  electric motors. (p. 278) 
Loeb, then, presents a compelling logical argument for 
the  need to  pursue  a micro-level analysis of  memory 
representations. His suggestion refers to the dynamics of 
this  representation,  whereas we  have  focused on the 
static structural nature of  the representation. 
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books on memory just after the turn of  the century that 
are still  unfamiliar  to  most  contemporary  students  of 
memory  (see  Schacter,  1982), is  probably  most  well 
known for coining the term “engram.” In discussing the 
engram, or memory trace, Semon considered both the 
micro and macro levels of  analysis that we have identified 
in this paper. In doing so,  he pointed out that discussions 
of  localized and distributed  function need not be mu- 
tually exclusive, so long as separate levels of  analysis are 
considered: 
We  seem, therefore, to be placed in the dilemma of 
having either to reject altogether a localisation theory 
which imagines that each single engram can be 
stored up in a cerebral cell-or  in a comparatively 
small complex of  cerebral cells-as  in a separate 
drawer, or to admit that in the human organism a 
special interdependence exists between definite re- 
gions of  the cerebral cortex and the ecphory, or, as 
perhaps we ought to say, the possibility of  ecphory 
of  distinct individually-acquired  engrams. The latter 
admission implies, however, the recognition of  a cer- 
tain localisation, although it need not be the kind 
which makes each nerve-cell of  the brain a reposi- 
tory for a specific engram. (pp. 119-120). 
Here,  Semon  explicitly  allowed  for  the  possibility  of 
macro-level localization of  memory function while  re- 
jecting the idea of  micro-level localization of  individual 
engrams. Semon (1909/1923) also put forward ideas con- 
cerning the nature of  the engram at a psychological level 
of  analysis. He argued  that  engrams are composed of 
specific features or components that represent different 
aspects of  an experience, and that the various compo- 
nents of  an engram  are linked  together  by  processes 
operating during retrieval (see Schacter, 1982 for further 
review). 
It  is worth noting that although our discussion of  the 
early  literature  has  focused  on theorists  who posited 
physiological bases for memory representations, not all 
writers  of  this period believed  that memories are rep- 
resented  in  a  physical  form. For  example, McDougall 
(1911) and Bergson (1911) both maintained that memory 
can be discussed only in terms of  a nonmaterial, “psych- 
ical” field. Not surprisingly, the speculations of  these and 
other dualists were neither cited nor further developed 
by subsequent memory theorists. Unfortunately, the ideas 
of  Loeb  and Semon suffered the same fate, despite their 
clear relevance to contemporary concerns. 
From Lushley  to Hebb 
Karl  Lashley is  among the best-known researchers  into 
issues about memory representation. His work involved 
a return to the macro level of  analysis, as it was directed 
toward  identifying  where memories  are stored  in  the 
brain. In a long series of  experiments he systematically 
varied  the location  and extent of  cortical  lesions, and 
then tested the effects of  such ablations on memory (and 
other cognitive functions). He found support for the law 
of mas action, which  supposed that  the impact of  a 
brain ablation depends on the size, rather than the site, 
of  the damage (similar to  Flourens). These results  led 
Lashley (1950) to  conclude that memory is not simply 
composed of  an isolated representation, but rather that 
multiple  representations  of  a single event are formed, 
and that memory must be highly associative in nature. 
Most relevant to the question of  distributed vs. localized 
representations, he was forced to accept that memory is 
distributed  throughout  the brain. Lashley’s conclusion, 
however, was based  on his inability to  isolate any one 
part of  the brain  as responsible for memory function, 
but  as Zangwill (1963) pointed  out, his  results do not 
necessarily eliminate the possibility of  localized function. 
Thus, Lashley’s idea that there was some equipotentiality 
of  function  could be  applied  within  specialized  (e.g., 
localized)  areas  of  the cortex. This position  has  since 
been incorporated  in the recently  developed “parallel 
distributed processing” (PDP) models (see below). 
At about the same time, Gestalt psychologists also ad- 
dressed the issue of  memory representations. They ar- 
gued  for  an  isomorphic  relation  between  the 
psychological and physiological processes  of  represen- 
tation. For  example, Kohler  (1947)  suggested that  “All 
sound theories of  memory, of  habit, and so forth, must 
contain hypotheses about memory traces as physiological 
facts. Such theories must also assume that the character- 
istics of  traces  are more or less  akin  to  those of  the 
processes by which they have been established’ (p. 252). 
These statements, however, remain relatively neutral with 
respect to  the issues  of  where or how the traces  are 
represented. Koffka  (1939, however, did consider the 
macro-level question of  where memory is represented. 
He argued that Lashley’s results provided proof that “no 
trace has an independent function, nor even an indepen- 
dent existence” (p. 454). Citing Lashley’s work again, he 
posited a distributed representation: “When Lashley says 
that maze habits are not localized he does not mean that 
learning leaves no after-effect, i.e.,  no traces whatsoever. 
It  is perfectly compatible with his results that for maze 
habits these traces are distributed over the entire cortex” 
(p. 454). Other Gestaltists, however, took Lashley’s  results 
to the extreme and suggested that the entire concept of 
a memory trace, and therefore presumably of  represen- 
tations in memory, was incorrect. For instance, Wheeler 
and Perkins (1932) argued that “the brain, therefore, is 
not a mass of  structures each having its own particular 
and independent  functions. In face of  these facts the trace 
theory is inconceivable” (p. 387). 
Although Gestalt psychologists clearly considered both 
psychological and physiological aspects of  memory rep- 
resentations, critics  contended that  they were not  en- 
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(1953) points out, 
to provide any indication of  what a schema is in physi- 
ological terms, or how it might operate. 
Gestaltists freely propound physiological hypotheses 
on the basis of  their psychological evidence-some- 
times with a cavalier disregard for neurological 
facts-but  they have never been known to modify 
any of  their psychological views as a result of  physio- 
logical discoveries! (pp. 41-42) 
D.O. Hebb (1949) picked up where his mentor Lashley 
left  off.  Hebb  was  convinced  that  the  phenomena 
unearthed  by  Gestalt  psychologists  demonstrated  that 
memory representations had to embody some “dynamic” 
aspect. However, as a neuropsychologist he did not ac- 
cept Lashley’s pessimistic conclusion that engrams could 
not be localized in the brain. His solution to this dilemma 
has already been noted in the consolidation section of 
this paper: memories are represented in distributed col- 
lections of  nerve cells known as cell assemblies. Because 
these assemblies are distributed, and because they can 
be activated through  diverse  entry  points,  damage  in 
various parts of  the brain  should  have  little  effect on 
particular  memories.  It  is  only when  extremely  large 
ablations  are made  that  one might  expect to observe 
memory loss; Lashley’s Law of  Mass Action, therefore, can 
be accounted for within this approach. Hebb also pro- 
posed  mechanisms by which memories  are formed at 
the neuronal level: correlated activity between presynap- 
tic and postsynaptic elements led to  increased synaptic 
efficacy in the future. This mechanism, lately referred to 
as Hebb’s Law, has been included in many recent learn- 
ing theories, and has  gathered  considerable empirical 
support. At  the time Hebb proposed his cell assembly 
theory, and its solution to both the macro- and micro- 
level issues of  memory representation, there was no way 
to assess his ideas. 
In  this  era  of  physiologically  oriented  hypotheses 
about  the  nature  of  memory  representation,  Bartlett 
(1  932) presented a purely psychological hypothesis. He 
proposed extending the concept of  the “schema,” origi- 
nally proposed by Head and Holmes (191  2), to memory. 
The concept  of  a schema, or continually  evolving am- 
malgamation of  memory traces, was developed with ref- 
erence to the question of  postural recognition (Head & 
Holmes, 1912). Bartlett used the concept of  schema to 
account for the “reconstruction” in memory that he ob- 
served  in several experiments (Bartlett,  1932). For  ex- 
ample, in repeated testing of  memory for a simple story, 
Bartlett  observed  that  although  subjects  provided  the 
same theme of  the story over recall trials, the manner of 
expression  and details reported differed. Because  the 
concept of  a schema entails a rejection of  the notion that 
specific memories  map  onto individual  traces, Bartlett 
could be viewed as a proponent of  distributed represen- 
tations of  memory at the micro level. However, he failed 
7be Modern Era 
In a sense the modern era of  research on memory rep- 
resentations  can be  said to have  been ushered in by 
Gomulicki’s comprehensive review of  ideas about the 
memory trace in 1953. In his paper, Gomulicki identified 
several  reasons  why  the puzzle  of  memory  remained 
unsolved, one of  which was  “the comparative lack of 
cross-fertilization of  the relevant sciences” and the con- 
sequent absence of  a “recognized science of  ‘mnemol- 
ogy’ (covering all aspects of  the memory problem) on 
which one can specialize” (Gomulicki, 1953, p. 65). How- 
ever, it took several years before his call for interdisci- 
plinary research was heeded. 
Before interdisciplinary approaches began to evolve, 
several new lines of  investigation were developed. For 
example, Van Heerden (1963) added to the independent 
sources of  theories about the nature of  memory repre- 
sentations by relating  memory to  the newly conceived 
notion of  holography. Van Heerden argued that the three- 
dimensional  information  storage  properties  of  holo- 
graphic images are a suitable model for associative mem- 
ories. Although not expounding at length on a theory of 
memory storage, he did suggest that there are two  dif- 
ferent regions for storage-ne  “where all information 
of  a passed experience is mixed to make fast search and 
recognition  possible;  and a  second region where the 
information  about  different  situations  is  stored  sepa- 
rately” (Van Heerden, 1963, p. 399). Although a few for- 
mal  cognitive  models  of  memory  have  incorporated 
some of  the basic  ideas of  the holographic  metaphor 
(e.g., Pribram,  1971; Eich,  1982; Murdock,  1982), Van 
Heerden’s theory has been for the most part overlooked 
in the psychological literature. 
Another  independent line of  inquiry came with  the 
emergence of  cognitive  psychology  in  the late  1960s. 
Cognitive psychologists addressed the issue of  represen- 
tations in memory in purely psychological terms, viewing 
underlying physiology as an unnecessary complication. 
So, for instance, Tulving and Bower (1974) claimed that 
the past history of  theories about the memory trace 
(see Gomulicki, 1953) contains many hypotheses that 
have been unprofitably tied to further guesses about 
the neurological mechanisms involved; and the func- 
tional hypothesis is discredited when the postulated 
neurology is proven incorrect, inadequate, or naive. 
Rather than focusing on the nature of  neuronal interac- 
tions, then, cognitive psychologists proposed models of 
memory based on “features” or “attributes” of  the mem- 
ory trace  (Bower,  1967; Underwood,  1969; Tulving & 
Bower  1974). For example, Tulving and Bower  (1974) 
defined a memory trace as 
(P. 231) 
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atically varied retrieval conditions, that provides a 
description of  what a given trace does. The trace 
thus becomes a hypothetical construct we use to pull 
together this large list of  relations between different 
questions directed at the system and the output from 
the system. (p. 294) 
These models consider only the micro level of  analysis. 
Underwood (1969) acknowledged the limitation of  these 
types of  theories when he suggested that an individual 
trace can be viewed in terms of  its attributes (e.g., tem- 
poral, spatial, modality), but  that  such a conception is 
“not compatible with statements about memory traces as 
long as the plural is emphasized” (p. 571). 
For  much  of  the  1970s, research  on the nature  of 
memory representations proceeded along quite separate 
lines  in  neural  and  cognitive  science.  Neuroscientists 
focused on two  issues: the cellular mechanisms under- 
lying memory formation, and the regional localization of 
memory storage for specific types of  learning. This latter 
enterprise reflected the general acceptance by most neu- 
roscientists that there is no single memory organ, and 
that  memories  for  different  kinds  of  information  are 
likely to be stored in quite different brain regions. Thus, 
the search for the  engram became the  search for any 
engram (see Thomson, 1976). It is an unresolved empir- 
ical  matter  as to whether  engrams located in different 
brain  regions are formed by the same underlying mo- 
lecular  mechanisms. As we noted above, much recent 
attention has focused on  the potential neural instantiation 
of  Hebb’s synaptic principles; there is considerable evi- 
dence that long-term  potentiation, discovered by L0mo 
(1966), and further explored by Bliss and L0mo (1973) 
and Bliss  and Gardner-Medwin  (1973),  is  the cellular 
basis for Hebb’s Law (see McNaughton, Douglas, & God- 
dard, 1978; and many others). 
As neuroscientists were closing in on  the mechanisms 
of  memory formation, cognitive scientists began to ex- 
plore connectionist  models of  memory that  eschewed 
contact with the brain, at least until the mid-1980s. There 
is no need for us to extensively review the emergence 
of  these models; we wish only to make a few points here. 
Hebb once again  provided  the foundation, in that  his 
neuropsychological model was an example of  connec- 
tionist thinking. Indeed, in the 1950s there were several 
attempts to develop cognitive versions of  Hebb’s ideas, 
including  Rosenblatt’s  pwceptrons  (e.g.,  Rosenblatt, 
1958) and Widrow and Hoff’s Adaline (e.g., Widrow & 
Hoff, 1960). These models, resting on Hebb’s thinking 
and on the logical formalisms proposed  by  McCulloch 
and  Pitts  (1943),  ran  into  certain  problems  and were 
largely .abandoned for 30 years. Nonetheless, the basic 
ideas were already in evidence in 1950. The more recent 
emergence of  PDP  models was heralded by  the publi- 
cation of  the volumes  by  McClelland, Rumelhart, and 
their colleagues (1986a,b). Though predicated on an at- 
tempt to make cognitive models of  memory more “brain- 
like,” initially these  models  paid  little  more than  lip 
service  to  the  considerable  knowledge  about  brain 
mechanisms that had been developed  in the neurosci- 
ences in the previous  30  years. This situtation is only 
gradually changing, as PDP modelers pay attention to the 
details of  real neural  circuits, and the often surprising 
properties that emerge from these circuits. 
PDP models do, however, represent an interesting po- 
tential  solution to  the questions about memory repre- 
sentation that we have been considering. Within these 
models,  representations  are  distributed  across  large 
numbers of  elements (read: neurons), and the knowl- 
edge inherent in these representations is embodied not 
only in the elements but also in the connections between 
elements.  Indeed,  learning  involves  changing  the 
strength of  these connections, and therefore a memory 
representation is actually a pattern  of  connections of  a 
particular strength, or “weight,”  within a large ensemble 
of  elements.  However, McClelland  and Rumelhart  are 
quick to point out that their model does not ignore the 
extensive evidence for cerebral localization of  function: 
A system that uses distributed representations still re- 
quires many different modules for representing com- 
pletely different kinds of  things at the same time. 
The distributed representations occur within these 
localized modules. For example, different modules 
would be devoted to things as different as mental 
images and sentence structure, but two  different 
mental images would correspond to alternative pat- 
terns of  activity in the same module. The representa- 
tions advocated here are local at a global scale but 
global at a local scale. (1986, Vol. 1, p. 79) 
Within such a model, many memories can be super- 
imposed  on the same collection of  elements, thereby 
capturing the property of holograms that so attracted van 
Heerden, without, however, requiring that the brain ac- 
tually function like a hologram. 
summary 
Early  investigations generated  insights  concerning the 
nature of  memory representations that are still relevant 
today. For example, Loeb  provided strong logical argu- 
ments  for a  (neuroscientific)  micro-level analysis into 
how, and not just where, memory was represented. On 
the cognitive side,  Semon discussed the features of  mem- 
ory engrams, and the manner in which they might be 
related to  retrieval  processes. However, most or all of 
the physiological explanations from these early thinkers 
through the Gestaltists, were based on speculation (or 
logic)  rather  than  on empirical  evidence. Therefore, 
whereas  the thinking  of  these  early  researchers  may 
reflect some degree of  convergence between psycholog- 
ical and physiological approaches, the actual experimen- 
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not available. 
Psychologists such as Bartlett showed little interest in 
physiological discussions, but  Lashley brought  a  back- 
ground in psychology to bear on his neuroscientific re- 
search  aimed  at  finding  the  engram.  Similarly, Hebb 
(1949) intended his book “to seek a common ground 
with the anatomist, physiologist, and neurologist, to show 
them how psychological theory relates to their problems 
and at the same time to make it more possible for them 
to contribute to that theory” (p. xii). Here, at least, was 
a commitment to a convergent agenda. 
Until  very  recently, however, collateral  relations be- 
tween psychological and physiological approaches have 
been the rule as cognitive and neural scientists interested 
in  memory  representations  pursued  independent  re- 
search agendas: cognitive psychologists focused on fea- 
tures  and  attributes, while  neuroscientists  focused  on 
cellular mechanisms. The recent advent of  PDP models, 
however, promises to help bridge the gap between the 
two fields. It remains to be seen if PDP formalisms will 
prove capable of  accounting for the vast range of  memory 
phenomena in neurobiologically plausible ways. But at 
least the pursuit of  the engram is now proceeding with 
both cognitive and neuroscientific constraints in mind. 
MEMORY SYSTEMS 
We  noted at the outset of  the previous  section that  in 
addition to providing micro-level analyses of  how spe- 
cific memories are stored,  early investigators also offered 
macro-level hypotheses concerning where memory pro- 
cesses are localized. Such hypotheses led naturally to the 
suggestion that different forms or types of  memory might 
be localized  in  different parts of  the brain  (e.g., Gall, 
1835). More recent discussions of  this issue have taken 
the  form  of  debates  about whether  memory  is  more 
usefully viewed  as a single, monolithic system or as a 
collection of  multiple interacting systems. Although this 
debate has been at the forefront of  the cognitive, neu- 
ropsychological, and neurobiological  literatures for the 
past decade, the roots of  the discussion are to be found 
in  nineteenth-century  philosophical  and medical  writ- 
ings. We consider first these early writings, and then turn 
our attention to contemporary discussions. 
Historical Overview 
Philosophy 
One problem that can arise when considering early writ- 
ings that are relevant to the issue of  memory systems is 
that it is frequently difficult to ascertain whether an au- 
thor was distinguishing between two or more systems. 
Because  it  is  all too easy to  read  current  conceptions 
into past formulations, we will attribute a “multiple mem- 
ory systems hypothesis” to an author only if an explicit 
statement arguing for a fundamental difference between 
types of  memories is provided. Consider, for example, 
the  views  of  the medieval  philosopher  St. Augustine, 
presented in a fifth-century treatise. Augustine implied a 
distinction between memories and habits when he sug- 
gested that  animals  “could not even  form their  habits 
except by their memories” (cited in Hermann & Chafin, 
1988, p. 118). However, he did not provide any reason 
to  assume that memories  and habits  reflect the opera- 
tions  of  different  underlying  systems;  his  statement 
would be equally compatible with the view that there is 
a single system in which habits are simply overlearned 
memories. 
A  similar  sort of  issue  arises when considering  the 
following  statement  by  the thirteenth-century  philoso- 
pher and theologian Thomas Aquinas: “Pastness can be 
considered either in relation to the thing known or in 
relation to the act of  knowledge” (cited in Hermman & 
Chafin, 1988, p. 147). It is tempting to suggest that “the 
thing known” refers to an explicit form of  memory, and 
that “the act of  knowledge” refers to an implicit form of 
memory. However, such an inference probably reflects 
more of  our own familiarity with this recently developed 
distinction than of  an explicit hypothesis about multiple 
memory systems on the part of  Aquinas. 
To our knowledge, the first clear delineation of  a dis- 
tinction  among types  of  memory  in  the philosophical 
literature  (or elsewhere)  was  provided by  the French 
philosopher Maine de Biran (1804/1929), who proposed 
three types of  memory: mechanical, representative, and 
sensitive  (see  Schacter,  1987).  In  Maine  de  Biran’s 
scheme mechanical memory refers to the acquisition of 
motor habits, representative memory refers to memory 
for facts and events, and sensitive memory refers to mem- 
ory for emotions and feelings. Maine de Biran discussed 
at great length the properties and functions of  these three 
types of  memory, and there can be little doubt that he 
viewed them as distinct. On the other hand, he was also 
aware of  the difficulties in  drawing  sharp distinctions 
among hypothetical mental entities, noting that “The gra- 
dation which separates mechanical memory from sensi- 
tive memory is, in certain cases, rather difficult to grasp” 
(Maine de Biran, 1804/1929, p. 163). 
More than 100 years after the publication of  Maine de 
Biran’s monograph, Bergson (19ll)-also  a French phi- 
losopher-advanced  a  distinction  between  forms  of 
memory that is perhaps even more familiar to contem- 
porary students. He argued that “the  past survives under 
two  distinct forms: first in motor mechanisms; secondly, 
in independent recollections” (p. 87).* To illustrate the 
two  hypothesized forms of  memory, Bergson  used the 
example of  trying to  learn a lesson by  heart. He con- 
trasted memory for the content of  the lesson, on the one 
hand, with memory for the individual readings that were 
required to learn it, on the other. He likened the former 
process to a habit, and suggested that “it is stored up in 
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initial impulse, in a  closed system  of  automatic move- 
ments which succeed each other in the same order and, 
together, take the same length of  time” (p. 90, emphasis 
added). By  contrast, he likened memory for the individ- 
ual readings required to learn the lesson “to an event in 
my life; its essence is to bear a date” (p. 90). Bergson 
also argued for a fundamental  difference in how these 
two types of  memory are stored: “the memory of  a given 
reading  is a representation, and only a representation” 
whereas the memory of  the  learnt lesson “is no longer 
a representation, it is  an action  . . . I might believe it 
innate, if  I did not choose to  recall at the same time, as 
so  many  representations,  the  successive  readings  by 
means of  which I learnt it. Therefore these representa- 
tions are independent of  it” (p. 91). 
The analyses of  Maine de Biran  and Bergson  stand 
alone among early philosophical discussions in terms of 
the depth with which they defended and explored dis- 
tinctions among forms of  memory. More recent philo- 
sophical treatments include the distinction made by Ryle 
(1949) between knowing bow and knowing that, which 
set  the stage  for later  discussions  of  locale vs. taxon 
memory systems (O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978), and proce- 
dural vs.  declarative memory systems (Anderson, 1976; 
Cohen & Squire, 1980). Similarly, Furlong  (1951)  and 
Munsat (1966), who distinguished between memory for 
events and memory for facts, represent  a precursor to 
Tulving’s  distinction  between  episodic  and  semantic 
memory systems (Tulving, 1972, 1983). 
Medical and Psychological Perspectives 
Inquiry into the notion of  multiple memory systems also 
has roots  in medical science of  the nineteenth century 
when many researchers  argued for distinctions  among 
what they viewed to be fundamentally different kinds of 
memory.  The terminology  used  by  these  investigators 
varied widely; some referred to different “forms of  mem- 
ory,” others spoke of  different “types of  memory,” and 
still others talked about “partial memories.” All  of  them 
agreed, however,  that  memory  is  not a  monolithic  or 
unitary entity. Two kinds of  evidence were taken as sup- 
port for this view: (1) within- and between-subject vari- 
ations of  mnemonic ability; and (2) anatomical separation 
of  brain centers and selective impairments of  mnemonic 
function after brain damage. 
The  observation  that  the efficacy of  different  mne- 
monic  abilities varies  within  and between  individuals 
constituted  an  important  source of  evidence  for  Gall 
(1835),  one of  the earliest proponents of a nonunitary 
view of  memory. He objected to the ideas of  those prac- 
titioners of  faculty psychology who saw memory as an- 
other  indivisible faculty of  the mind:  “Perception and 
memory are only attributes common to the fundamental 
faculties, but not [among]  the fundamental faculties them- 
selves” (p. 251).  To  support his  view, Gall  noted, for 
example,  that  some people  have  exceptionally  good 
memory for places, whereas others have unusually good 
memory for music. If  memory constitutes an indivisible 
faculty, argued Gall, then one would not expect to find 
variations  in the efficacy of  mnemonic function across 
different domains; those who possess good memory in 
one domain  should  possess  equally good memory  in 
another. Similar logic and evidence were used by  the 
phrenologist Spurzheim (1834) to argue that each fun- 
damental faculty of  the mind possesses its own memory: 
“A person may, therefore, possess an excellent memory 
of  one kind, be very deficient in another, and be without 
a  third  entirely” (p. 84).  The  notion  that  within- and 
between-individual variations of  mnemonic abilities con- 
stitute evidence  favoring a distinction  among different 
forms of  memory is  also apparent in the later work of 
several late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century writ- 
ers (e.g., Bascomb, 1901;  James, 1890; Luys, 1887). How- 
ever, the observed differences could also be attributed 
to the individuals’ differing  levels of  prior knowledge 
and expertise in  the two areas  (cf.  Fodor,  1983). The 
realization  that  such  observations  do not  require  the 
postulation of  mutiple forms of  memory was  first ex- 
pressed long ago by Ladd (1909), who observed that “the 
diverse forms of  memory are chiefly to be ascribed to 
diverse tastes and habits, and the interest and attention 
which accompany them” (p. 138). 
A  second, rather  more compelling class of  observa- 
tions supporting the idea that memory should be divided 
into  different  forms  derived  from  reports  concerning 
patients  with  pathological  disorders of  memory.  Ribot 
(1882) made explicit the logic that  relates  ideas about 
multiple forms of  memory to  observations of  memory 
pathology: “If, in the normal condition of  the organism, 
the different  forms of  memory are relatively indepen- 
dent, it is natural that, if  in a morbid state one disappears, 
the others should  remain  intact” (p. 142). Ribot cited 
several cases that he believed were consistent with this 
hypothesis, and that suggested to him that verbal mem- 
ory, visual memory, and auditory memory are dissocia- 
ble. Observations of  memory pathology were also used 
by Lewes (1879) and Claparede (191 1~951)  to argue for 
a  nonunitary  view of  memory  much  like  the one ad- 
vanced by Ribot. 
Although the logic of  the argument  put  forward by 
Ribot concerning the usefulness of  pathological dissocia- 
tions is fundamentally sound, the evidence cited by Ribot 
and others was  not  convincing:  It  consisted  of  either 
anecdotes or uncontrolled  observations concerning in- 
dividual cases of  memory impairment. Perhaps because 
the critical evidence was so weak, it is difficult to  find 
any discussion of  the hypothesis of  multiple  forms of 
memory for nearly 50 years after the flurry of  these turn- 
of-the-century speculations. Instead, throughout the first 
half of  the twentieth century, memory was viewed as a 
unitary entity by empirically oriented researchers. 
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The analysis of  memory systems presently occupies cen- 
ter stage in  cognitive, neuropsychological, and psycho- 
biological research on memory. hs  the previous section 
illustrated,  initial speculations  about different  memory 
systems were derived  from two  independent lines  of 
inquiry. Modern  conceptions of  this  issue  can also be 
traced along relatively independent lines of  development 
that have only begun to converge during the past several 
years. 
The first line of  investigation derived from studies of 
intact  and brain-lesioned  animals.  Perhaps the earliest 
relevant paper was Tolman’s (1949) well-known article 
on forms of  learning. Tolman reviewed the parameters 
of  numerous  learning  paradigms, argued  that  the evi- 
dence pointed  toward the existence of  more than one 
form of  learning, and in so doing implied that multiple 
systems were needed to account for the different types 
of  learning  that  he had  delineated. Tolman’s analysis, 
however, focused  more on learning than  on memory, 
and did not pursue in any detail the notion of  multiple 
learning Vstems. 
Within the animal literature, the concept of  different 
learning systems emerged more clearly from the debate 
surrounding place vs. response learning. Two hypotheses 
were proposed to  explain how rats learned to navigate 
mazes. Hull and followers (e.g., Blodgett & McCutchan, 
1947) argued that  rats are guided by simple stimulus- 
response behavior, whereas Tolman and supporters (e.g., 
Tolman, 1948) argued that rats are guided by  cognitive 
maps of  a particular place. Could these two  hypotheses 
reflect the operations of  two distinct underlying systems? 
Initially, Restle (1957) suggested that there is no differ- 
ence between the two  types of  responses, and that rats 
simply respond to different cues. However, some years 
later O’Keefe and Nadel (Nadel & O’Keefe,  1974; O’Keefe 
& Nadel, 1978) contended that two distinct systems-the 
taxon and locale systems-underlie  response and place 
learning, respectively (see also Hirsh, 1974). O’Keefe and 
Nadel marshalled various kinds of  evidence to  support 
their  thesis,  including  most  prominently  the fact  that 
lesions in the hippocampal  formation disrupted locale, 
but not taxon, learning (see O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978, for 
discussion). They also specified the brain structures that 
supported the two systems, focusing at length on the role 
of  the hippocampus in the locale system. More generally, 
they offered an explicit  and detailed  multiple memory 
systems hypothesis that was based largely on the animal 
literature, yet  also made  use of  pertinent observations 
with human amnesic patients. 
At  about the same time, Olton and colleagues (e.g., 
Olton, Becker, & Handelmann, 1979) put forward a re- 
lated  distinction  between  working  memory  and refer- 
ence  memory  systems  that  was  motivated  by 
demonstrations of  dissociations in rats with hippocampal 
lesions during performance in an eight-arm radial maze. 
The ideas of  Olton et al. differed in several respects 
from those of  O’Keefe and Nadel. Most notably, O’Keefe 
and Nadel argued that the hippocampus (locale system) 
is involved particularly in spatial memory, whereas Olton 
and  collaborators  contended  that  the  hippocampus 
(working  memory  system)  is  involved  in  storage  and 
retrieval of  various types of  episodic information. More 
recently, Sutherland and Rudy (1989) put forward a re- 
lated distinction between a configural associative system 
that constructs  higher order representations from ele- 
mentary stimuli and depends on the hippocampus, and 
a simple associative system that records changes in the 
strength of  associations  between  stimuli  and does not 
depend on the hippocampus. 
The foregoing hypotheses are based largely on studies 
of  rats. Mishkin and colleagues (e.g.,  Mishkin, Malamut, 
& Bachevalier, 1984; Mishkin & Petri, 1984) advanced a 
distinction between a memory system and a habit system 
that is based primarily on studies of  nonhuman primates 
in which lesions to the limbic system impaired memory 
performance on delayed matching and nonmatching to 
sample tasks, but spared learning on object discrimina- 
tion  tasks. By  this view, what  Mishkin et  al. label  the 
“memory” system involves cognitive  representation,  al- 
lows for retention of  a single episode, and depends on 
the hippocampus, amygdala, and other limbic structures; 
by contrast, their “habit” system does not entail any cog- 
nitive representation, involves incremental stimulus-re- 
sponse learning, and depends on a corticostriatal system 
(see also Mahut & Moss, 1984). Finally, it should also be 
noted  that  evidence for  multiple  memory  systems has 
been reported  in other animals, including various spe- 
cies of  birds (for review and discussion, see Sherry & 
Schacter, 1987). 
The second line of  pertinent research has been pro- 
vided by studies of  normal and brain-damaged humans. 
The general issue of  multiple memory systems was first 
brought  to  the  attention  of  cognitive  psychologists by 
Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968; Shiffrin & Atkinson, 1969), 
who put forward what came to be known as the “modal 
model” of  memory. They distinguished  between three 
memory “stores”:  sensory register, short-term store, and 
long-term store. Thus, the Atkinson and Shiffrin model 
focused on different systems that were hypothesized to 
be involved in short-term and long-term retention. A- 
though  the modal  model was  ultimately  deemed too 
simple, various other proposals for separate systems in- 
volved in short-term and long-term retention have been 
advanced (e.g., Baddeley, 1986; Warrington, 1982). 
Within the domain of  long-term memory, the hypoth- 
esis  of  multiple  memory  systems  was  advanced  most 
forcefully by Tulving (1972, 1983) with his well-known 
distinction between episodic and semantic memory. Ac- 
cording to Tulving, the episodic memory system is nec- 
essary for  context-specific  recollection  of  events from 
one’s  personal past, whereas semantic memory subserves 
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have  already mentioned  precursors of  this view in the 
philosophical  literature  (Bergson,  191  1; Furlong, 1951; 
Munsat, 1966). In  addition, the psychologists  Reiff and 
Scheerer (1959)  presented  a  detailed,  though  far  less 
influential, distinction  between  memoria  and reminis- 
cence in their monograph on memory and hypnotic age 
regression. 
Although Tulving’s distinction generated extensive de- 
bate and discussion about multiple memory systems (see 
Tulving, 1983, 1984 for review and discussion), the gen- 
eral  issue also  received  a great  deal of  cogency  from 
neuropsychological  observations reported in studies of 
brain-damaged amnesic patients. During the 1960s, Mil- 
ner, Corkin, and colleagues (Milner, 1965; Corkin, 1965, 
1968; Milner, Corkin, & Teuber, 1968) reported the strik- 
ing observation that  the densely amneSic patient H.M. 
could acquire new motor skills in near-normal fashion 
despite his inability to  recollect the episodes in which 
he acquired  the skills. This dissociation  suggested the 
possibility that  motor memory might depend on a dif- 
ferent system than memory for facts and episodes (Mil- 
ner,  1965,  1970; Corkin,  1965).  Subsequent  research 
revealed that amnesic patients could acquire other sorts 
of skills in  normal  or near  normal  fashion, including 
perceptual skills (e.g.,  Cohen & Squire, 1980;  Moscovitch, 
1982; Nissen & Bullener, 1987) and even some cognitive 
skills  (e.g., Baddeley,  1982; Saint-Cyr, Taylor, &  Lang, 
1988; Squire & Frambach, 1990). These observations led 
Cohen and Squire (1980; see also, Cohen, 1984; Squire, 
1987) to argue for a distinction between a hippocampally 
based declarative memory system that underlies memory 
for facts and events, and a procedural memory system 
that supports acquisition of  skills and other spared learn- 
ing abilities in amnesic patients. 
At  about  the same time that  Milner and  colleagues 
performed their investigations of  skill learning, Warring- 
ton and Weiskrantz (1968,1974) reported their important 
series of  experiments on word completion performance 
in amnesic patients. They demonstrated that after study- 
ing a list of  words, amnesic patients showed relatively 
normal  memory performance when given word stems 
or fragments as cues, despite the fact that they performed 
quite poorly on standard tests of  recognition memory. 
Warrington and Weiskrantz initially discussed  their  re- 
sults in  terms of  sensitivity to  interference  and conse- 
quent retrieval impairments (see previous section), and 
not  in  terms of  multiple  memory systems; subsequent 
experimental work was necessary to clarify the precise 
implications of  their  observations  (cf. Graf, Squire, & 
Mandler, 1984; Schacter, 1985b). Nevertheless, their dem- 
onstration that severely amnesic patients could show in- 
tact facilitation of  task performance as a function of  prior 
exposure to a stimulus-a  phenomenon now referred to 
as  a  priming  effect  (cf.  Shimamura,  1986; Tulving  & 
Schacter, 1990&ultimately  led to a great deal of  empir- 
ical research on priming effects in amnesic patients and 
normal  subjects  that generated  new  hypotheses about 
multiple memory systems. For example, within the neu- 
ropsychological literature, a large number of  studies have 
explored the properties and limits of  priming in amnesic 
patients  (e.g., Cermak,  Talbot,  Chandler,  & Wolbarst, 
1985; Gabrieli, Milberg, Keane, & Corkin,  1990; Graf, 
Shimamura, & Squire, 1985; Schacter, Cooper, Tharan, & 
Rubens, 1991; Schacter & Graf, 1986). 
In the cognitive literature, multiple memory systems 
hypotheses have been fueled by demonstrations of  var- 
ious kinds of  dissociations between priming and remem- 
bering.  Thus,  for  example,  it  has  been  shown  that 
priming and recalVrecognition performance are affected 
differently by manipulations such as type  of  study pro- 
cessing (e.g.,  Jacoby & Dallas, 1981;  Graf& Mandler, 1984; 
Schacter, Cooper, & Delaney, 1990), studyhest modality 
shift (e.g., Graf et al., 1985; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Roe- 
diger & Blaxton, 1987; Schacter & Graf, 1989), retention 
interval (e.g., Mitchell & Brown, 1988; Tulving, Schacter, 
& Stark, 1982), and several other variables (for review, 
see Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988; Roediger, 1990; 
Schacter, 1987). In addition, several studies have revealed 
that priming shows stochastic independence from rec- 
ognition memory-that  is, the magnitude of  priming is 
uncorrelated with  recognition  performance (e.g., Hay- 
man & Tulving, 1989;  Jacoby & Witherspoon, 1982;  Schac- 
ter et al., 1990; Tulving et al., 1982; but see Hintzman & 
Hartry, 1990; Shimamura, 1985). 
The dissociations observed in cognitive and neurop- 
sychological studies led to various proposals  about dif- 
ferent forms of  memory. At a descriptive level, Graf and 
Schacter (1985; Schacter, 1987) advanced  a  distinction 
between explicit memory (conscious recollection of  ex- 
periences)  and implicit memory  (performance facilita- 
tions  without  conscious  recollection).  Atlhough  the 
explicithmplicit distinction does not speak directly to the 
question of  whether different systems underlie the two 
forms of  memory, other proposals do. As  noted earlier, 
the distinction between declarative and procedural mem- 
ory systems was  put  forward  intially to  accommodate 
findings of  preserved skill learning in amnesic patients. 
Although it was suggested that priming effects also de- 
pend  on  the  procedural  system  (e.g., Cohen,  1984; 
Squire, 1986), subsequent  research  with  dementia  pa- 
tients  revealed a double dissociation  between priming 
and skill learning-Alzheimer  patients showed intact skill 
learning  and impaired  priming  whereas  Huntington’s 
disease patients showed impaired skill learning and in- 
tact priming (Heindel, Salmon, Shults, Walicke, & Butters, 
1989tthereby indicating that the two phenomena  do 
not depend on the same underlying system (cf. Heindel 
et al., 1989; Schacter, 1987; Squire, 1987). Based on the 
neuropsychological evidence,  together  with  the previ- 
ously mentioned  research on preserved  habit  learning 
in  nonhuman primates, a number of  investigators pro- 
posed  that  various  skill  learning  phenomena are me- 
diated  by  a  corticostriatal  system  that  functions 
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declarative memory system (Heindel et al., 1989; Mishkin 
et al., 1984; Sherry & Schacter, 1987; Squire, 1987). 
Proposals  have  also  been  made  regarding  memory 
systems that are involved in priming, and by implication, 
spared in amnesic patients. One possibility is that prim- 
ing involves a semantic memory system (e.g., Cermak et 
al., 1985), but  various  properties  of  the phenomenon 
cast  doubt  on this  idea  (see Roediger,  1990; Schacter, 
1990; Tulving et al., 1982). Hayman and Tulving (1989) 
proposed that priming reflects the operation of  a “trace- 
less,” “quasi-memory’’ system  that  functions  indepen- 
dently of  episodic and semantic memory, but they did 
not  relate  this hypothetical  system to  underlying brain 
structures.  Schacter  and  colleagues  (Schacter,  1990; 
Schacter et  al.,  1990, 1991; Tulving  & Schacter, 1990) 
proposed that many priming effects reflect the operation 
of  a presemantic perceptual representation system (PRS) 
that  is  in  turn  composed  of  several  subsystems: each 
subsystem  is  dedicated  to  the representation  and  re- 
trieval of  the form and structure, but  not the meaning 
and associative properties, of  words (word form subsys- 
tem) and objects (structural description subsystem; see 
also, Gabrieli et  al.,  1990 and McCarthy & Warrington 
1990 for a discussion of  neuropsychological evidence). 
By  this  view,  the various  PRS  subsystems  depend  on 
posterior  cortical  structures, such  as inferior temporal 
regions and extrastriate occipital cortex. 
It must also be noted that although the evidence for 
some form of  multiple  memory systems hypothesis  is 
compelling to many, a number of  cognitive psychologists 
have claimed that it is not necessary to postulate different 
memory systems, preferring instead the idea of  a single 
but flexible memory system (e.g., Jacoby, 1983; Masson, 
1989;  Roediger, 1990;  Roediger & Blaxton, 1987). By their 
view, observed dissociations between different types of 
memory tests can be accounted for in large part by the 
degree  of  overlap  between  cognitive  operations  per- 
formed at study and test. Although this view can account 
for many of  the impliciVexplicit dissociations observed 
in  normal  subjects, it  has  a  rather  more difficult time 
coming to grips with findings of  preserved implicit mem- 
ory  in  severely  amnesic  patients  (Hayman  & Tulving, 
1989; Schacter, 1987, 1990). 
summary 
Early philosophers and scientists discussed the possibility 
of  multiple forms of  memory from quite different per- 
spectives, and the types of  memory they posited differed 
substantially. In particular, philosophers such as Maine 
de Biran and Bergson, who offered hypotheses that were 
couched at the psychological level, stressed a difference 
bemeen a mechanicavhabit system and “actual” memo- 
ries. By  contrast,investigators who focused on the phys- 
iological  level  postulated  different  memories  for 
different faculties (e.g., Gall, 1835) or sense modalities 
(e.g., Ribot, 1882). Only when clinical accounts of  phe- 
nomena  now referred to  as implicit memory began to 
appear in  reports of  amnesic patients (e.g., Claparede, 
191  1;  Korsakoff, 1889/1955) did medical scientists begin 
to investigate the kind of  distinction that had been drawn 
by  philosophers.  There was  essentially  no interaction 
between those few investigators who offered hypotheses 
about multiple forms of  memory at either psychological 
or physiological levels, thereby reflecting the existence 
of  collateral relations between the two approaches. 
More recently, the research programs of  cognitive psy- 
chology and neuroscience have shown a much higher 
degree of  overlap; investigations  of  multiple  memory 
systems in each domain are having substantial impact on 
pertinent studies in the other. Thus, neuroscientists who 
investigate  memory  in  nonhuman animals  have  been 
influenced by neuropsychological studies of  human am- 
nesia  (cf. Mishkin et  al., 1984; O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978; 
Olton, 1989). Similarly, neuropsychologists  who study 
human amnesic patients have likewise made use of  find- 
ings and ideas from studies of  animals (e.g., Cohen, 1985; 
Schacter, 1985a; Squire, 1987; Weiskrantz, 1989). More- 
over, there are now a number of  papers concerned with 
the  issue  of  multiple  memory  systems  that  represent 
collaborations between researchers who focus on either 
human or  animal investigations (e.g.,  Eichenbaum, Fagan, 
Mathews, & Cohen, 1988; Schacter & Nadel, 1991; Sherry 
&  Schacter,  1987; Moscovitch, Winocur,  & McLachlan, 
1986; Zola-Morgan & Squire, 1985). 
It is interesting to note that nearly all of  the existing 
convergence between the animal and human literatures 
focuses  on the general  distinction between  a memory 
system that  subserves  recall  or recognition  of  specific 
items/episodes  on the one hand, and a  habit  or skill 
learning system that is involved in incremental response 
acquisition on the other. By  contrast, whereas memory 
systems have been postulated  in  the human  cognitive 
and neuropsychological literatures to accommodate dis- 
sociations  between  priming  and recall  or recognition 
performance (e.g., Schacter, 1990; Squire, 1987; Tulving 
& Schacter, 1990), there are as yet  no corresponding 
ideas and studies in the animal literature. This situation 
likely reflects the difficulties inherent in adapting to an- 
imal studies paradigms from the human literature that 
permit  experimental separation of  priming from other 
forms of  memory. It is a somewhat more straightforward 
matter to adapt and compare skill learning paradigms in 
studies of  humans and other animals, which may account 
for the observed convergence in this area of  the litera- 
ture. 
A second area of  convergent relations can be identified 
within the human literature. Specifically, cognitive stud- 
ies of  intact subjects and neuropsychological investiga- 
tions of  amnesic patients are currently exploring similary 
hypotheses about multiple memory systems. This trend 
is particularly evident in research on priming phenom- 
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show  a  high  degree of  cross-fertilization  and  mutual 
influence (cf. Cermak et al, 1985; Graf et al., 1984, 1985; 
Graf & Schacter, 1985;  Jacoby & Witherspoon, 1982; Roe- 
diger & Blaxton, 1987; Hayman & Tulving, 1989; Mos- 
covitch, Winocur, & McLachlan, 1986; Schacter, 1985b, 
1990; Schacter  et  al., 1991; Tulving, Hayman, & Mac- 
Donald, 1991). It should also be noted, however, that a 
similarly high degree of  convergent relations is not yet 
evident in studies of  skdl learning that bear on the issue 
of  multiple memory systems. Although paradigms from 
cognitive psychology have been used to study skill learn- 
ing in amnesia (e.g., Cohen & Squire, 1980; Moscovitch, 
1982),  and some cognitive psychologists have made note 
of pertinent findings with amnesic patients (e.g., Singely 
& Anderson, 1989), the voluminous cognitive literature 
on various types of  skill learning (e.g., Anderson, 1981; 
Kelso, 1982; Singley & Anderson,  1989) has  had  little 
impact on neuropsychological  research, which  in  turn 
has had at best a modest influence on cognitive studies. 
Progress in both areas would likely be facilitated if each 
paid greater attention to the other. 
CONCLUSION 
In this article we have taken a historical look at cognitive 
neuroscience analyses of  memory, focusing on issues of 
consolidation, the nature  of  memory  representations, 
and multiple memory systems. We will conclude by not- 
ing several general trends. 
First, it seems clear that the sort of  sustained interdis- 
ciplinary analyses of  memory  that  are essential  to  the 
development of  cognitive neuroscience constitute a rel- 
atively rare historical phenomenon. Although such early 
thinkers as Burhham, Loeb, Ribot, and Semon all made 
some attempts to  link psychological  and physiological 
perspectives,  there have  only been  a few-and  all  of 
them recent-examples  of  what we have referred to as 
convergent relations between cognitive and neuroscien- 
tific approaches. For the most part, previous attempts at 
“cognitive neuroscience”  have  taken  the form  of  in- 
formed (and  sometimes ingenious) speculations rather 
than of  systematic empirical research. These speculations 
reflect the existence of  what we have termed  compli- 
mentary  relations,  where concepts  or ideas  from  one 
discipline are used to supplement theorizing in another 
discipline. Although this likely reflects limitations on the 
methodological tools  that  were available to  earlier  in- 
vestigators, it  does serve to  highlight  the fact that the 
development of  an empirical cognitive neuroscience of 
memory represents a relatively recent development. 
A second, related point to emerge from our discussion 
is that prior efforts to link cognitive and neuroscientific 
approaches  have  frequently entailed  some type  of  re- 
ductionist strategy; that is, an attempt to explain a psy- 
chological phenomenon at a more “basic” physiological 
level of  analysis. Such attempts are not without  merit: 
they help to  focus attention on fundamental problems 
that are of  interest both to cognitive scientists and neu- 
roscientists, and reduce the likelihood that  researchers 
in each discipline will become mired  in the details of 
specific paradigms  and procedures at  the expense of 
global perspectives. Indeed, one could argue that think- 
ing about global issues regarding consolidation, memory 
representations, and multiple memory systems has been 
aided by prior speculations of  this kind, in the sense that 
they focus attention on the forest rather than the trees. 
Nevertheless, we also think  that  cognitive  neurosci- 
ence analyses or  memory must involve more than simple 
attempts  at  reductionism.  Interdisciplinary  interactions 
will  be most  fruitful when insights  from one level of 
analysis can inform and enlighten developments at an- 
other level of  analysis; that is, when neuroscientific find- 
ings  and  ideas  can  inform  cognitive  research  at  the 
psychological level of  analysis, and when cognitive find- 
ings and ideas can inform neuroscientific research at the 
physiological  level  of  analysis  (see  Nadel  & O’Keefe, 
1974; Schacter, 1986). It is just this sort of  interaction that 
is  characteristic of  convergent relations, and we can see 
the beginnings of  it in some of  the recent  research in 
each of  the three areas that we have considered. 
A third point to  note is  that an interdisciplinary  ori- 
entation  encourages  the investigation of  certain ques- 
tions that demand both neural and cognitive approaches. 
Consider, for example, the problem of  determining how 
long information is stored in the hippocampal formation. 
The logic of  much of  the research on retrograde amnesia 
and consolidation depends on the assumption that the 
hippocampus is the site of  memory storage (for certain 
kinds of  information) for only a limited period of  time, 
during which a permanent engram is being formed else- 
where. As  we have seen, the evidence used to support 
this claim comes primarily  from lesion  studies, which 
indicate  that  after  a  certain  retention  interval,  perfor- 
mance  no longer  requires  an intact  hippocampal  for- 
mation. Zola-Morgan and  Squire (1990), for  example, 
showed that after 8 weeks, hippocampal lesions dld not 
prevent normal performance on preoperatively acquired 
visual object discrimination problems. The authors in- 
terpret these data as evidence for a time limitation on 
memory storage in the hippocampus, but it is  not clear 
whether these kinds of  data alone can support such a 
claim. Because they were obtained in animals without a 
hippocampus, they cannot by definition address the pres- 
ence or absence of  memories in the hippocampus. All 
that  such  data  can  show is  that  adequate  memory  is 
established outside the hippocampus over a specific time 
period. The same logical limits apply to studies of  retro- 
grade amnesia in human patients with focal brain dam- 
age.  The  fact  that  information  stored  outside  the 
hippocampus can at some time support memory perfor- 
mance  does not  demonstrate  that  memory  within  the 
Poktm, et al.  I1  1 hippocampus has  faded  away. This  latter  claim  can be 
investigated only in studies of  animals (or humans) with 
an intact hippocampus that explore cognitive aspects of 
memory performance with appropriate behavioral  tests, 
and relate  them  to relevant  neurophysiology,  perhaps 
with a noninvasive  imaging technique. Interdisciplinary 
research is well-suited for, and is even a necessary con- 
dition of, resolving this kind of  issue. 
Although we  have focused on the merits of  interdis- 
ciplinary research programs, we have paid little attention 
to  what  some might see as their great limitation: only 
certain  levels  of  each  discipline  can  be  meaningfully 
discussed in terms of  the other. Cohen (1985) referred 
to the problem in general by discussing “the difficulty in 
deriving a complete understanding of  learning and mem- 
ory that  encompasses  all  levels  of  analysis”  (p. 428). 
Although  neuroscientists  may have the tools to  investi- 
gate cellular/neuronal changes that mediate memory, un- 
less these changes  can be  directly  related  to observed 
behavioral  differences  at  the cognitive  level,  studying 
them is of  little use to an interdisciplinary  research pro- 
gram. Similarly, while  encoding operations are clearly 
related to memory performance, unless these operations 
can  be  mapped  onto  recognized  neurophysiological 
changes in a meaningful fashion, their investigation is of 
little value to an interdisciplinary approach.  There is clear 
value  to  an interdisciplinary  program for memory re- 
search, but  it is not the only way  for memory research 
to  proceed.  Indeed, certain  technological  or method- 
ological advances can be accomplished only by concen- 
trating  on  the  problems  intrinsic  to  a  particular 
discipline. Nevertheless, we are optimistic that progress 
in understanding memory will be facilitated  by  the es- 
tablishment  of  convergent  relations  between cognitive 
and neuroscientific approaches, and that such an agenda 
can help to bridge the gap between mind and brain at 
many levels of  analysis. 
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Notes 
1. Because  the terms “cognitive psychology” and  “neurosci- 
ence” refer to relatively modern fields of  investigation, we use 
the more general terms “psychology”  and “physiology”  as his- 
torical antecedents of  each. 
2. The former type of  memory corresponds closely to Maine 
de Biran’s mechanical memory, and the latter to  his represen- 
tative memory. Given the similarity between the two concep- 
tualizations, and  the  strong  influence that  Maine  de  Biran 
exerted on subsequent French philosophers and psychologists 
(Ellenberger, 1970), it is  possible that Bergson’s ideas about 
forms  of  memory were to  some extent based  on the  1804 
monograph. However, Bergson did not  discuss or even  cite 
Maine de Biran in his 1911 book, and there is no  firm evidence 
that shows a direct influence. 
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